Abstract
Introduction
Mainly motivated by economic reasons, the use of COTS (Commercial OffThe-Shelf) microkernels appears today as an increasingly attractive design alternative in many application fields, including safety critical systems as well (e.g., on-board aerospace systems, railway signaling control systems, etc.).
Microkernels correspond to the last generation of real-time executives. From an engineering viewpoint, this technology is very appealing for flexibility reasons. A dedicated operating system (OS) can be developed on top of the very basic functions provided by a microkernel as a set of basic system services. These services can provide the application programmers with either a standard API (Application Programming Interface) such as POSIX, or a proprietary interface as in the ELEKTRA railway signaling system (for being able to run legacy software) [1] . All processes implementing these services run as a microkernel application and thus rely on its capability to detect faulty situations.
The flexibility of this technology is even more convincing when considering open microkernels. Indeed, in this case, the microkernel can be tailored to fit a specific objective or an application field, because it is organized as a set of modules, each instance of which can be selected according to the specific requirements. For example, a given form of scheduling policy (e.g., rate monotonic, earliest deadline first, etc.) can be specified as an off-the-shelf module, during the generation process of a dedicated microkernel. Moreover, a user-defined module can be used instead of a standard one (e.g., a two-level scheduler as in the ARINC 653 standard for aircraft on-board control systems [2] ).
The use of microkernels has an additional advantage. Because their specifications are often simple, their behavior can be more easily understood (from available documents). This can be used to define complementary error detection.
The development of safety critical applications often relies on a development process following de facto standards such as DO178-B [3] . Beyond the departure from standard requirements, the use of off-the-shelf software is a challenge for many developers of critical systems [4] . The concerns are even more crucial when considering the use of a COTS microkernel, since all applications running on top of it (including OS software) rely on its correct behavior. An error at the application level (either due to a physical fault or a design fault) should not propagate to the microkernel and prevent other applications to run. Conversely, errors affecting the microkernel itself should not propagate uncontrolled to the application level.
This paper elaborates on the challenges and objectives identified in [5] . Here, we describe and apply a methodology that helps one better characterize the behavior of a standard microkernel in the presence of faults. As long as such a behavior is known and -to some extent-predictable, errors can then be handled at the microkernel application level by several fault tolerance strategies. Either generic strategies (e.g., replication in case of microkernel crash) or more application dependent strategies can be defined and developed, when an error status or an exception is returned to the application level. Although timing and scheduling faults are of high interest in real-time applications, currently they are only partially addressed in this paper; work is in progress to address these issues in a more comprehensive way.
The remainder of the paper is organized into 4 Sections. Section 2 describes the motivations and the fault injection-based approach we have adopted for this work, as well as its position with respect to related research. The results presented in this paper have been obtained with a fault injection tool, called M AFALDA (Microkernel Assessment by Fault injection AnaLysis and Design Aid) which has been designed and implemented to these aims. The main features of MAFALDA are described in Section 3. A sample of the distributions for faulty behaviors observed for the Chorus ClassiX microkernel distributed by Sun are presented in Section 4. Finally, conclusions and directions for future work are given in Section 5.
Behavior analysis of COTS OS

Motivations
The use of COTS OS poses serious certification problems. It is noteworthy that recent specific efforts for developing the OSE real-time executive [6] have succeeded in its certification according to the IEC 1508 [7] . Although certification aspects are beyond the scope of this paper, we claim that the framework we propose provides a more general and promising approach for the assessment and improvement of the behavior of microkernel-based executives in the presence of faults, and can thus contribute to the certification process.
Because microkernels are not usually designed according to a development methodology recommended for critical software, their behavior may be weak from a dependability viewpoint. This is not surprising at all since their normal usage is often general. Because their size is to be kept small and they are a basic support for OS services, their error detection mechanisms must be enhanced at upper layers. Furthermore, microkernels are used in different target environments with different application profiles, so some classes of primitives may seldom be activated or even not activated at all. Accordingly, some error propagation channels could remain unknown. Finally, because software versions have usually a very short lifetime, it is difficult to improve our confidence on the basis of statistics from field experience.
Clearly, the confidence one can have in a microkernel depends on the impact of its failure modes on the upper levels. The origin of a fault can be physical or due to design or implementation.
Microkernel fault pathology and validation objectives
As for any software, an activated fault in the microkernel can propagate and lead to various types of failures layers (according to the causal chain fault « error « failure [8] ), which may impair temporarily or permanently the delivered services. These failures can be classified according to their severity.
The simpler case is when the microkernel enters an infinite loop or waits for a fictitious event. This can only be handled by external mechanisms, i.e., fault tolerance strategies based on (preferably diversified) replication. Even if of high severity, this situation corresponds to a "fail-silent" behavior of the microkernel, which has benefits from a dependability viewpoint [9] .
Alternatively, the fault can lead to an error that is detected by internal error detection mechanisms, either by software mechanisms (assertions, consistency checks, etc.) or by the underlying hardware (illegal memory access, illegal instruction, etc.). The error, notified either by an interrupt or by a returned error status, can respectively be handled at the upper layer, either by exception handling mechanisms or by analyzing the error status. The resulting error processing depends on the severity of the failure of the module: abort or automatic restart of the application software, cold-start of the entire system Unfortunately, internal error detection mechanisms are not always able to confine an error within the executive software. Indeed, the invocation of a module often relies on complex operations that may involve many synchronous and asynchronous interactions between microkernel components within the same supervisor address space. The error can thus propagate to several modules. When the behavior of the executive no longer matches the functional semantics associated to the microkernel modules, errors may propagate to upper layers software components and remain undetected. This is the highest severity level.
Overall methodology
As it allows for a detailed analysis of faulty behaviors, fault injection has long been recognized as a pragmatic and efficient means to assess the behavior of complex fault-tolerant computer systems (e.g., see [10, 11] ). Thus, fault injection is very much suited to help characterize the faulty behavior of COTS executives.
Following our preliminary work presented in [5] , we consider that a microkernel is composed of several basic modules. Each module operates on a set of input parameters In_params (I) and on the current internal state (persistent data structures) of the executive software, called the (executive) Context (Contex_In: Ci). The invocation of the module impacts the Context itself (Context_Out: Co), produces output parameters Out_params (O) and (possibly) returns an error Status (S). A fault occurring (or being activated) during the execution of a module may affect any of the output attributes Co, O and S. Our interest focuses here on the analysis of the consequences on the output attributes of a fault having led to the alteration of either I and Ci.
Hence, two forms of fault injection have been selected for the tool we have developed to analyze the behavior of a microkernel in presence of faults: (i) injection on the input parameters, and (ii) injection on the state of the microkernel.
Complementary forms of fault injection such as specific alteration of the functional activity of a module or injection on the output parameters have also been identified (see [5] ). For example, the first form can be (i) a wrong sequence of kernel operations invocation, or (ii) additional invocations of kernel operations. The first form is not part of the current implementation of MAFALDA. The second form would be rather suited to the analysis of the consequences of the faulty behavior of the microkernel on the upper layers; this case is not considered here.
The objectives of the analyses carried out in this paper are twofold: 1) Statistics obtained can be used to assess the coverage of the error handling mechanisms. 2) Deficiencies can be revealed in the microkernel (including in the error handling mechanisms), thus providing guidance for design improvements; this also encompasses the definition of an appropriate fault tolerance upper layer.
Related work
Several studies have addressed the assessment of COTS software in the presence of faults [5, 12, 13] . FINE [14] is a pioneering fault injection tool addressing the assessment of a COTS OS by corrupting the kernel address space.
The main objective of most recent studies is to evaluate the robustness of the application interface: the idea is to observe the behavior of the operating system when input parameters of a given type are corrupted. Among these studies, BALLISTA [13, 15] Our approach shares a similar black-box testing philosophy and the same interface robustness evaluation objective. Nevertheless, two main expansions can be identified. First, besides input parameters corruption, fault injection applies also on the internal address space of the executive (both code and data segments).
Second, and what is more important, the monitored events extend beyond system and process crashes or hangs; they encompass various exceptions and application failures as well, the latter being the most severe case from our viewpoint. This increased observability allows for a wide range of error cases to be evaluated (e.g., error propagation from the executive to the application level, error propagation within the microkernel itself (covert channels), etc.). These results constitute objective data (i) for characterizing the efficiency of the internal error detection mechanisms of a microkernel and (ii) for assessing the suitability of using such basic software layers in a safety critical application.
MAFALDA
The primary objective of MAFALDA is to analyze the behavior of a microkernel in the presence of faults 1 : interface robustness with respect to external faults, error detection coverage of the internal error detection mechanisms, error propagation 1 The design aid features supported by MAFALDA are not detailed in this paper. channels between microkernel internal components and the impact of its faulty behavior on upper layers. MAFALDA is a fault injection tool running on Solaris providing features for the description of a fault injection campaign, the execution the experiments (re-boot, loading, fault injection, etc.) and the collection of observed results for later analysis.
M AFALDA is based on the idea of a modular workload [16] matching the componentized architecture of a microkernel. Most of off-the-shelf microkernels can be seen as composed of several internal modules, each dedicated to a specific class of functionalities: synchronization, task management and scheduling, memory and communication management. Except for basic hardware-dependent machine code, all these modules provide an interface to the applicative level as a set of kernel operations, called primitives. All the primitives related to a given internal module are said to belong to a given class (synchronization class, memory class, tasking class, communication class). A workload process is suitable for exercising the microkernel functionalities corresponding to a given class. Each workload process implements a simple application using almost all available primitives from a given functional class.
The corruption of input parameters aims at evaluating the inherent robustness properties of the microkernel interface. It consists of corrupting a selected parameter before its delivery to the microkernel interface. Such a fault can be interpreted as the consequence of the propagation of an error from the application level to the executive level.
The corruption of memory cells within the memory image of the microkernel at runtime simulates either hardware or software faults. It consists of corrupting a randomly selected memory location of one functional internal module of the microkernel; this aims at characterizing the microkernel behavior in the presence of faults, but also at evaluating error propagation over their internal modules. This form of injection can lead to the propagation of errors from the microkernel to upper layers, thus affecting user application processes. The modular workload approach is an efficient way to activate kernel internal modules selectively, but also to observe inter-module error propagation by analyzing the behavior and the results of each dedicated workload process.
Finally, such results are also expected to be very much useful for focusing on the development of pertinent and cost-effective error handling mechanisms (wrappers) aimed at increasing the dependability properties [12, 13] . Moreover, once the failure profile of the candidate microkernel is well established then complementary error detection mechanisms can be developed and fault tolerance strategies can be defined at the upper layer, as suggested in [5] . MAFALDA can further be used to assess objectively the benefits provided by the integrated wrappers (see Section 5).
Architecture of MAFALDA
MAFALDA is based on a "classical" architecture that integrates three sets of components: components that form the workload to activate the various microkernel functional classes, components that perform fault injection either at the interface or within the microkernel address space, and components monitoring the experiments and devoted to results analysis. It is able to reboot the target machine, load the microkernel with a given configuration and interpret the Campaign File Descriptor. This file describes (using a specific description language) the type of fault injection experiments that will be performed during the campaign and the workload processes (Workload File Descriptor) used to exercise the microkernel functional classes.
The behavior of the Experiment Controller depends on the type of fault injection. For a parameter fault injection campaign the Experiment Controller loads the Parameter Injector on top of the microkernel on the target machine and the various workload processes (W1, W2, etc.). For a microkernel fault injection campaign the Experiment Controller loads the Microkernel Injector within the address space of the microkernel on the target machine and the various workload processes. For each experiment, the same workload process is loaded for every microkernel components. During the execution of each experiment, traces are collected and saved in the Log_File and the results of each workload process is stored in Experiment_Results files.
Fault model
The fault model currently implemented by MAFALDA corresponds only to two types of fault injection. The corruption of the input parameters is described in Figure 3 . It is performed for one workload process during each experiment, the others workload processes being left untouched.
The implementation of the fault injection within the microkernel address space is described in Figure 4 . Only one internal module is targeted by this type of fault injection during each experiment.
In both cases, a randomly selected bit within a randomly selected parameter or byte in a module is flipped. 
Fault injection techniques
Several SWIFI techniques have been investigated and led to many fault injection tools like FIAT [17] , DOCTOR [18] , FERRARI [19] , FINE/DEFINE [14, 20] , SOFIT [21] , XCEPTION [22] , etc. As in XCEPTION, M AFALDA uses processor debugging facilities to inject both permanent and transient faults. This approach allows monitoring the activation of the faults and also limits the interference with the target executive. This fault injection technique is thus less intrusive than in the previous cases where fault injection is performed by inserting software traps. Because most likely faults are transient, M AFALDA emulates such faults by programming the processor debug registers to stop execution when the control flow reaches the selected location (instruction or data). Then, the fault is injected and a breakpoint is set up to detect the instruction execution or the data access. Finally, the fault is removed by the trace handler routine which resumes execution. Permanent faults are injected in the same way; because they are not removed by the handler routine, the wrong value is kept at the memory location.
M AFALDA uses both spatial and temporal fault triggers: (i) the fault is injected when execution flow accesses a specified memory location either for data read/write access or for instruction fetch; (ii) regarding temporal aspects, a delay from the beginning of the application is set before the fault is injected.
Experiment description, expected results and analyses
A fault injection campaign with MAFALDA consists in a sequence of actions as described by Figure 5 . First, the workload requested in the Campaign File Descriptor is built (step 1) and a Reference Experiment launched without fault injection to obtain the correct results of the application software (step 2). These results will be later used in the analysis as an Oracle for the identification of errors propagated to the application level. Then, the loop of individual experiments is launched (step 3). Depending on the type of Fault Injection experiment, memory locations are corrupted either within one single workload process (parameter fault injection) or within one single microkernel internal component (microkernel fault injection). During an experiment round, all workload processes (W1, W2, W3 -one for each microkernel functional class) are executed concurrently and their results collected. These results are always compared to the Oracle to identify if one workload process was corrupted (either the injected workload process or a different one). This means that an error has propagated through the microkernel.
Indeed, the various faulty situations that can be identified are observed at three different levels. The upper level (#3) concerns the application failure, i.e. wrong application behavior or results (denoted APPFAIL or AF) or the application hang (denoted APPHANG). The second level (#2) relates to errors successfully detected by the microkernel error detection mechanisms, error status (denoted ERROR STATUS or ES) and exception (denoted EXCEPTION or EX). The last observation level (#1) corresponds to low level failures : system hang, kernel debugger, panic (denoted respectively SYSHANG, KDB , PANIC) The kernel debugger is activated by internal microkernels built-in mechanisms able to detect some erroneous internal state. This handler enters an infinite loop and provides the user with few basic functions enabling the internal state to be visualized and some simple corrective actions to be carried out. Panic corresponds to a system hang with basic exceptions providing the error location and some state information.
The final result provided by MAFALDA is the distribution of events (error propagation or various error detection events) observed during a fault injection campaign and also the latency of the various exceptions raised.
Experiments with a COTS microkernel
The experiments reported in this section have been performed using the Chorus ClassiX r3 microkernel. The various fault injection campaigns are run in parallel on a rack of 10 PC-Pentium machines in order to speed-up the campaign.
The Chorus ClassiX r3 microkernel
The Chorus ClassiX microkernel [23, 24] is an open version of previous versions of this microkernel [25] . It is composed of various internal modules following the categories given below and providing or not primitives at the microkernel interface: -Core (COR): set of primitives for the management of threads and actors (Chorus multi-threaded processes) and hardware related basic functions (e.g., interrupts, timers, traps, MMU, etc.), some of which not belonging to the interface. -Synchronization (SYN): set of primitives for the management and the use of semaphores including mutexes, real-time mutexes, event flags, etc. -Memory Management (MEM): set of primitives for the management and the use of memory segments including functions for flat memory, protected address spaces management policies, address space sharing, etc. A customized microkernel can be generated from the available off-the-shelf instances of the above internal modules. Also, some of them can be user-defined (a specific scheduler, for instance) and can be used during the generation process, providing thus the users with various options to specialize the microkernel for a given application context. The microkernel and the application processes have separated address spaces; the microkernel is running in supervisor mode while application processes are (normally) running in user mode.
The various fault injection campaigns have been performed using MAFALDA on Chorus ClassiX r3 with the following configuration: -SYN: standard module handling semaphores; -MEM: protected address space management policy; -SCH: priority-based FIFO preemptive scheduling policy; -COM: standard module for local and remote communications.
We report in the sequel of this section the results obtained from the fault injection campaigns. In our experiments, fault injection was applied to the SYN, MEM and COM modules either using microkernel fault injection, in both code (Section 4.2) and data segments (Section 4.3), or using parameter fault injection (Section 4.4). However, fault injection has not yet been carried out directly within the core and scheduling modules. Nevertheless, our workload processes (holding a pre-determined number of threads) have been designed to be deterministic and their scheduling to be known in advance (in the reference execution). Then, corrupting the execution of synchronization primitives (either using microkernel or parameter fault injection) may have an impact on threads scheduling. Such occurrences have been reported in the results presented. Errors like thread hang or deadlock correspond to application hang in the figures, errors like illegal access to shared resources and wrong threads sequencing leading to incorrect results correspond to the application failure case.
Microkernel fault injection: code segment
Distribution of errors. We present here the results obtained by injecting into the code segment of various microkernel modules of our candidate microkernel. The first internal module considered in these experiments is SYN. More than 16000 faults have been injected from which 66% led to non activated faults.
Although such a figure shows the intrinsic difficulty in carrying out significant tests, it is worth noting that the same problem has been found in related work. For instance, in FERRARI such outcomes (labeled "no error") were directly excluded from the statistics. In FINE, a similar issue has been observed: 68% of the faults injected have not been activated (labeled "very long latency").
Several explanations can be given for such a high percentage of non significant tests: -the activation of the software module under test does not lead to an internal control flow accessing the injected location; -the latency is very long and the resulting error cannot be observed during the duration of the experiment; -the injection applies to unused fields in data structures or in instruction format.
Because of the fault injection technique used in MAFALDA (processor debug registers and handlers), we are sure whether the fault has been activated or not. This allows the first case to be identified although it is still difficult to make the distinction between the two latter, which is a classical concern in fault injection experiments. In the results given below, these two cases are aggregated into a single label, called "no observation" (fault activated, but no observed effect). It is clear that only activated faults are of interest and thus subsequent results presented in this section only consider such cases.
About 3000 observed errors led to the following results (see Figure 6 -a) . Among these errors, 9% have led the application to fail: i.e. the results obtained were different from the reference results and no detection signal was raised. This means that the error has not been detected by internal error detection mechanisms and has propagated to the application level, corrupting its final results. At the other end, 28.5% of the activated faults fall into the "no observation" category. Error propagation. MAFALDA also allows observation of error propagation channels within the microkernel. Indeed, some errors propagate from the injected module to some companion internal modules. For instance, when SYN was the injected module, the propagation has affected the COM and the MEM internal module. Similarly, when MEM and COM are the injected modules, some errors propagate to the two other companion modules, as illustrated in Figure 7 . The results show that a fault injected into a given internal module that propagates to a different module may lead to the following observed events: application failure, error status, exception raised. This means that these events have been observed first in a workload process different from the workload process focusing on the injected internal module. For instance, among the faults that propagated when MEM was the injected module, 44.2% affected SYN and 55.8% affected COM. The propagation has been detected because workload processes for SYN and COM produced wrong results. Additionally, many errors have propagated when the injection was performed into the MEM module (181/2924). Clearly, due to internal dynamic memory allocation, an error in this module strongly affects the behavior of microkernel companion modules.
Exception coverage and error latency. In all experiments, most of the exceptions raised (83%) led to a segment violation (segFault exception) when the fault was injected in the code segment of the module. The other exceptions are invalid instruction code (InvOpCode in 10%) and co-processor error (copError 7%). The same distribution was obtained with all three modules since exception mechanisms are common to all of them.
Error latencies can also be obtained with MAFALDA (see Figure 8 ). Both exceptions and kernel debugger failures are considered. However, since both failures presented the same error latency distribution, only the latency distribution for exceptions is given. These similarities are partly explained by the fact that the kernel debugger failure is raised by a microkernel-defined exception. The distribution shows that exceptions can be raised instantaneously (340/1135 zero latency exceptions, i.e. 30% -current instruction execution) when the faulty instruction is executed or later during the execution of subsequent instructions. If not raised immediately, 80% of the exceptions are raised with a latency of less than 4 ms. Finally, we can also observe from experimental results that few of them (142, i.e. 12%) are raised with a latency beyond 10 ms. Among them, 42 have been raised before 30 ms and the remaining have been raised beyond 4.5 s. The latter depends very much on the control flow activated by our workload processes.
Microkernel fault injection: data segment
For each microkernel modules, faults are now injected into their data segment. In this case, less faults have been injected and thus less errors have been observed. Clearly, it is very difficult in this case to predetermine the access to data locations because it is very dependent on the control flow activated within the microkernel by the corresponding workload process. On the contrary, when injecting into the code segments, the segment implementation table (address of module primitives) is available at generation time and MAFALDA is able to identify the control flow (trace mode) within the injected module: these elements have been used to speedup the experiment by selecting specific injected locations.
The number of errors depends also of the size of the data segments and the probability of activation which cannot be known in advance, in this case. Another important parameter is also the duration of the campaign (weeks). For these reasons, the number of observed errors is smaller in this case.
Distribution of errors.
The results presented in Figure 9 Figure 9 . Distribution of errors -data segment Error propagation. In the experiments carried out, no error propagation to other modules was observed when injecting into the COM module data segment. Figure 10 shows the error propagation results for the SYN and MEM modules. This is not surprising since a wrong data value, when injected, does not have an immediate effect but later in the program execution. Also, less than 80% of exceptions were raised before 4 ms. Some exceptions have been raised beyond 10 ms (27/310, i.e. less than 10%). Again, this depends on the workload activity.
Parameter fault injection
Distribution of errors. Flipping a single bit at the interface of a primitive should enable the control checks performed by the microkernel on parameters delivered during the call to be evaluated. Although all injected faults have been activated, some did not lead to an observed effect. This type of injection was performed on the three modules leading to the results presented in Figure 12 . 
Figure 12. Distribution of errors -parameter fault injection
Actually, a faulty parameter is sometimes very difficult to detect since it requires very clever semantics checks which are not provided by a standard microkernel. For instance, performing such type of injection in primitives parameters of the synchronization module leads to the application failure in 87 % of the cases (illegal access to a critical section, resources no longer accessed, thread hang). The remaining 13% correspond to an unobserved effect (fault masked, or very long latency).
The reason for this singular behavior can be explained as any parameter value is accepted by the synchronization module 2 . For instance, a wrong semaphore queue number leads to the creation of a new semaphore queue data structure in the microkernel. When the number of token of a release request is corrupted, the value of the semaphore is just changed without any additional control..
It is worth noting that the above results have been observed for the use of semaphores in user mode with Chorus ClassiX r3 and could be very different with another candidate microkernel; this is very implementation dependent. In particular, the use of semaphores in supervisor mode leads to different results (see Figure 13 ). The reason for this is that the control flow of the primitives in supervisor mode is very different. Input parameters are not processed in the same way by the primitives: for instance, a corrupted identifier of a semaphore queue (unknown queue id.) leads to the creation of a new queue when running in user mode while it leads to an error detection when running in supervisor mode (exception, panic, KDB, system hang). The reason for this is that the kernel is confident with the given parameters and makes a straight usage of them. The proportion of undetected failures is still very high in this case, strengthening the need for additional checks (see [5] Figure 13 .
Distribution of errors -SYN primitives in supervisor mode
Error status coverage, exceptions, error propagation and latency. The most important outcomes provided by the microkernel regarding parameter fault injection is an error status returned to the user application, such as K_INVAL (some inconsistent process id) or K_UNKNOWN (process not reachable), etc. The type of exceptions that we observed are very limited and only one was raised in these experiments, segFault (segment violation). Also, few errors propagated from one module to another. In this case also, most propagated errors have been observed when injecting within the memory module which is a central one often used by internal companion modules (dynamic memory allocation).
Finally, latencies in this case showed a different distribution for the memory module (see Figure 14) ; three populations can be observed centered at 3, 5, 7 ms, these values being related to the way our workload uses the different memory primitives. For example, a faulty memory buffer allocation will be detected when a data structure in the workload process are mapped into the memory buffer. Also some exceptions have a very high latency and are over 10 ms. 
Conclusion and future work
The decision to include COTS microkernels in safety critical systems clearly calls for specific environments for evaluating they behavior in the presence of faults. A clear understanding of their failure modes enables the operating system software built on top of their basic functionalities to take into account such events, either for placing the system in a safety state or trying to tolerate the fault. However, in many safe critical systems, it is mandatory customizing even the very basic functions of the COTS microkernel. Thus, it is unlikely that relevant statistical figures can be obtained due to the limited number of instances in use.
Indeed, the primary interest of MAFALDA is to obtain quantitative results on a single instance of a given microkernel, whatever are its functionalities and composition in terms of standard, customized and user-defined modules. These results enable the designer of a safety critical system to take appropriate decisions regarding the use of the microkernel in a system. In order to understand whether or not a given candidate can be used, one has also to define the profile of the workload activity for a given application domain. This profile can change the activation of the microkernel and could lead to different results; according to our experience, changing the profile of workload processes does not impact very much the results. The same internal error detection mechanisms are used whatever the control flow is within the microkernel. However, this has to be confirmed by more intensive experiments. It is worth noting that running applications in supervisor mode (as illustrated in Section 4.4) may have a strong impact on the behavior of the microkernel.
Although reasonably good for off-the-shelf microkernels not designed to deal with all possible faulty situations, it is worth noting that the results we obtained may not be acceptable for safety critical systems and applications. Of course, different results could be obtained for a different candidate microkernel. A comparison of these results with several microkernels (e.g., VxWorks) is one of our next objectives. This involves updating MAFALDA with a Virtual Microkernel Interface, VMI (like the VOS in Eternal [26] ), to be mapped onto any microkernel interface. This would enable the same workload processes to be used. Nevertheless, some additional features of the new target microkernel involve revisiting the workload processes. In this case different results could be obtained.
Our current work focuses on performing fault injection into the core and scheduling modules, in order to extend the preliminary study of the impact of a fault on processes scheduling sketched in this paper. The main difficulty is to design a specific workload able to detect faulty situations.
The main insight from this work is that the use of a COTS microkernel in a safety critical system requires additional semantic checks to achieve better error processing efficiency. This point is currently being investigated by implementing fault containment wrappers able to perform these checks. These wrappers are based on a formal specification of the various functional classes corresponding to the microkernel modules. Such specification can be easily extracted from the available documents as the semantics of the few microkernel functions is often simple and well known. Nevertheless, the black box approach is a very limiting factor and we are currently investigating a reflective approach to facilitate the implementation of wrappers. According to our first experiments with this approach [5] , the results obtained are far better in some cases (the high proportion of application failure with parameter fault injection in the synchronization module can be significantly reduced) and give more confidence in a COTS microkernel for use in safety critical systems. This is why MAFALDA is also a good tool for Design Aid.
